As promised at the close of the first post, we will explore the second topic in this series:

          I acknowledged at the beginning of the first post on this subject that the motivation for exploring it came from David Johnson, my friend and former student. He is also one of my most faithful readers, who frequently comments on my blogs. As a present university professor and a gifted and published writer, he always gives me something to think about and usually points me in a direction I had not considered. Such was the case with this undertaking, although as I confessed before, I cannot promise that I have touched on all the relevant topics he would have liked or done justice to the ones I have chosen. That said, let us proceed.       

The Relationship of Compromise to the Principles Crucial to our Integrity

            The first task, which I encountered very quickly in my reading and research, is both a substantive and semantic issue—there is a mini-plethora of terms that need to be “sorted,” as the British might say—e.g. interests, desires, values, principles, positions, integrity, duty, to name a few of the most common ones. Since I’m not sure there is a universal consensus in the definition and appropriate employment of some of these terms in this context, I’ll establish my own use of them while also trying to be faithful to the way they are applied in a source being quoted or referenced.

•        The term, principle,” takes the top of the list for me, being the technical term for what I called a tenet, a belief, so important to me that it constitutes “a ditch I’ll die in.” An example from my own life and career in higher education would be “academic freedom”—that is, full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, freedom in the classroom in discussing subject matter, while always striving to be accurate, and to show respect for the opinions of others. It was “foundationally” important to me, in agreeing to teach in a religiously affiliated institution, that the President affirmed and guarded academic freedom (he did!)—it was “a ditch I’d die in!”

•        Connected to and supportive of one’s principles are “values,” held closely because we consider them desirable, important, worthwhile; they are the motives behind purposeful action. For instance, academic freedom was obviously a value that informed the “principle,” along with other values, such as being fully informed on the subjects I taught, seeing teaching and learning as the core of my responsibility, resting on a foundation of liberal arts values (I expect you get the picture, so I’ll stop “detailing to death” each of these terms).

•        For thoughtful people, their “interests” and “desires”—essentially of equal weight—are generally shaped by or are consistent with their principles and values, although sometimes they can be seen to have “wandered” a bit.

•       “Positions” refer to the stances taken in a disagreement between parties based, depending on their strength, on the individuals’ principles, interests, or desires.

•       “Integrity” denotes that moral quality and strength of character that supports and guards one’s principles.

•        And finally, “duty” in this context is that sense of obligation, of responsibility, that arises out of one’s integrity and that may be connected to one’s principles or, in some cases, to the entity—community, organization, etc.—that one represents in a disagreement or attempt to compromise.

That said, let us move on. Principles, as I have defined them and as I am using them, obviously stand at the “top of the ladder” in terms of importance to the parties of a disagreement who seek some resolution of the dilemma—that is, if a principle, as distinct from an interest or desire (as I have defined them), is at stake for either or both parties. Consider the common precept that it is permissible to compromise interests but not principles. The problem is not that the distinction between interests and principles can be fuzzy—although it can, because one person’s interest might be another’s principle—but rather that compromises of principle and interest may be neither morally nor practically distinct, at least from the perspective of an observer.

We will discuss in a moment circumstances in which a principle might be compromised but it is obviously important to be able to distinguish between principles on the one hand and interests or desires on the other when negotiating the possibility of a compromise—as one writer put it, “guard and maintain the principles; compromise the desires.” And it is the reason that my friend, David Johnson, argued that it is easier to find common ground if we “focus on the interests of the parties rather than their positions.” He acknowledges that this approach to compromise was also promoted by Roger Fisher and William Ury in their seminal work Getting to Yes, which was published in 1981 and arose out of their work with The Harvard Negotiation Project. And he goes on to argue that the more we understand the interests of the parties, the more we can craft solutions out of the rich variety of “colors” that our mutual friend, Joel Stegall, described so eloquently on Facebook and which I referenced a couple of times in the previous post. To illustrate his point, he uses an example drawn from Fisher and Ury:

In another illustration that makes the point, two men get into an argument at a library because one wants to keep a window open while the other wants to close it; neither is willing to go halfway. The librarian asks each man for his reasons. One wants the window open to get fresh air; the other wants it closed to avoid a draft. So, the librarian opens a window in an adjoining room to provide air flow and avoid creating a draft. She resolved the conflict, first by defusing the emotions that would have hindered the discussion, and then by focusing on the men’s underlying interests, rather than their positions on opening or closing a particular window.

These are clever and creative “stories with more than a moral,” but their importance lies not primarily in their wittiness or ingenuity, but in their thoughtful applicability to finding common ground through a careful exploration of interests and desires when seeking compromise.

            While that is clearly good advice with reference to concentrating on the interests of the parties rather than their positions, and certainly to the advantage of successful compromises, there are times, nevertheless, when a confrontation between strongly held principles may not be avoidable. When that happens, what is one to do? On the one hand, this kind of advice can easily be found in multiple writings on the subject:

• we should identify those principles we feel cannot be compromised—know the things you cannot compromise on and don’t be afraid to state your views.

On the other hand, this argument is also pervasive and persuasive:

• leaders who want to get anything done have to adopt a compromising mindset. Rather than standing tenaciously on principle, they have to make concessions.

Amy Gutman and Dennis Thompson, in one of their several articles on the subject of compromise, suggested, in a conciliatory attempt, that ” A classic compromise gives something to all parties, which means that . . . the outcome will not come down on the side of a single principle or theory.” And in the same tone, they posit that “compromise faces in two directions: forward to the bargains we strike, backward at what we had to sacrifice to get there.”

      `Since anyone involved in situations that require seeking resolution to disagreement on a crucial issue is likely at some point to face this conundrum where strongly held principles are in play, we need to address the roles of integrity and duty.

I have already defined integrity as that “moral quality and strength of character that supports and guards one’s principles,” and duty as that “sense of obligation . . . that arises out of one’s integrity and that may be connected to one’s principles or, in some cases, to the entity—community, organization, etc.—that one represents in a disagreement or attempt to compromise.” It is, of course, when duty is connected more strongly to your community or family or another entity that you value than it is to your principles, that your integrity can be stretched in uncomfortable ways. To put it clearly, is it acceptable to compromise your principles if it seems that “duty calls” in another direction?

Jeremy Schwartz in a 2016 article (see reference in Sources Consulted) observes that according to a traditional understanding, integrity is the virtue of holding fast to one’s principles in the face of temptations. So to “compromise integrity” will likely sound paradoxical to some and downright immoral to others.  But there are cases where what is required by self-interest—by which he means guarding one’s principles— and what is required by duty are in conflict, and which one will outweigh the other will depend on the circumstances of a given situation. 

He further suggests that “integrity is the virtue that governs rather than forbids compromise. In other words, integrity does not just forbid compromise; it sometimes demands it.”

The last thing I want to say on this topic has to do with the crucial importance of trust in any situation of compromise, particularly when a principal is in play. Gutman and Thompson, again, address this issue by referencing the philosopher George Santayana, whom they identify as a “friend of compromise,” and who argued that in a compromise where you sacrifice something valuable, your assessment of it is substantially affected by whether you believe the other party bargained in good faith. “You may be willing to give up a principle if the process is fair, but . . . if you do not trust ‘the other side,’” you may be tempted to dismiss the deal and walk away.

And, finally, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, in an article on “The Ethics of Compromise,” asserted that “movement forward . . . is only achieved when parties of conflicting. . . values approach each other with mutual respect, willingness to engage in mutual sacrifice, and a respect for the good faith . . . intentions of their . . . opponents” [emphasis mine].

I’ve held you to this topic for too long, although the blame lies in part on the number and interrelatedness of the terms and concepts integral to the subject matter. However, it would have been even longer, and no doubt better, had I quickened both the theoretical and the practical approaches with illustrative accounts of actual compromise situations rather than staying as strongly on the descriptive and explanatory approach. Well, there’s always “another day.”   I do thank you for your patience and persistence, and now offer you a respite. In a third post, we will proceed to the third topic:

III. The Importance of Knowing When We Will and Won’t Compromise

I hope you will stay with me, yet again.

Sources Consulted

“Valuing Compromise for the Common Good,” Amy Gutmann and Dennis F. Thompson. Daedalus, Spring 2013.

“Integrity: the virtue of compromise,” Jeremy Schwartz, Palgrave Communications, Article number: 16085, November 29, 2016.

”Ethics of Compromise,” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016, A. Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_2380-1.

“The Mindsets of Political Compromise.” Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, American Political Science Association, 2010.

“Our divided times are an opportunity for empathy. Really.” Jamil Zaki, Robb Willer, Jan Gerrit Voelkel, and Luiza Santos. Op ed, Washington Post, 12/29/2020.

“Build on Common Ground,” Editorial Board, op.ed., NY Times, Dec. 12, 2020.

“How to Know When to Compromise: 4 Key Questions to Ask,” Tess Pajaron Goalcast, July 28, 2017.

“Common Ground and Common Good,” H.B. Gelatt, Positive Uncertainty, August 16, 2015,

“Does Common Ground Require Agreeing on the Common Good? “ Common Ground Committee, February 28, 2018.

“On the possibility of principled moral compromise,” Daniel Weinstock, Published online: Sept. 2, 2013

Shortform, Book Summary: Getting to Yes, by Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981, 3^rd ed. 2011).