Those of you who have faithfully stayed with me through the first three posts on this subject, have been subjected to some version of the introductory paragraph with each post, so enough is enough. If you are just now joining us, welcome, but I would encourage you to go back to the earlier posts for the sake of background and continuity. But if you prefer not to do so, this final topic will, in some sense, “stand on its own feet.”

Ethical Norms That Determine Whether and How We Compromise

Begging your forgiveness for my wading you into philosophy—and apologies to those of you for whom this is “Old Hat,” “same song, second verse,” “been there, done that”—I promise not to wander too far into the weeds on this topic. The point here is that there needs to be some “standard” for your principles—your integrity, the “ditches you’ll die in”—that you understand and with which you are comfortable.

When you say that this is what is “right,” with regard to a decision you have made based on a principle you hold, you have invited the question, “right as compared to what?” What is the norm, the criterion, the “standard” that justifies a decision that is “right?”  We are confronted every day—individually, in groups, in communities—with issues, problems, decisions that press us to take an action that has “moral weight,” that might require compromise, and that has the capability of being right or wrong. And then there’s that pesky question, “right or wrong as compared to what?”

Of course, that isn’t true of every issue that comes up. Some value judgments are non-debatable. If you say you like liver and onions, I might think you a bit weird (in fact, I do), but how you experience the taste of something is in your private domain. And that goes for enjoying walking in the rain, preferring Bach to Beethoven, liking mathematics (or philosophy), or being in love with Susan (or with Marc). Although they rarely arise in a situation needing compromise, these kinds of value-judgments about what we perceive or feel are not debatable.

BUT, if I say I favor euthanasia, or abortion, or am opposed to gene therapy, then I have made a value statement that is debatable and that, if pressed,  requires a relationship to some standard of right or wrong.

Let me pose a plausible dilemma for your consideration:

You live in a private residential community of a dozen or so homes which has a Homeowners’ Association to which each residential owner pays annual dues that support road maintenance and other needs. The community has been in existence for about 30 years but still has 3 or 4 vacant lots, one of which you own and the rest of which are owned by the Association.

It was unlikely that anyone would purchase and build a home on the lots after all these years, but you have had an offer from a builder who constructs affordable prefab houses and makes them available to low income families. You are a staunch supporter of affordable housing and other assistance for low income and underprivileged people—it’s one of the 3 or 4 “principles” that comes close to qualifying as “a ditch you’ll die in”—so you propose to donate your lot to the builder and encourage the Association to do the same with the lots it owns.

But the rest of the homeowners are opposed because the home the builder proposes does not meet the minimum specifications required in the Homeowners Association Agreements for homes built in the development. They refuse to make an exception to the Association standards (even though some of them requested and were granted exceptions—minor ones, admittedly) because they fear it would lower the value of their homes. It’s a standoff. What should you do?

So what are the “right as compared to what” classical norms upon which principles are based and that are important to be understood and considered when compromise is a possible and/or desirable outcome to disagreement?

While it’s certainly possible to find a more complicated and nuanced set of such norms, I will try to honor my promise not to get too far into “the weeds” and offer just three, which I would argue are the “basics” from which any others are drawn.

• Perhaps the most difficult one in the context of compromise goes by several names—Formalism, Duty-based, Ethics of Principle—and posits that an action is right or wrong in itself, depending upon whether it conforms to or violates a universal moral law that applies to all people in all times and places. This is deeply imbedded in cultural, religious and philosophical history—e.g. the Ten Commandments viewed as absolute, incontestable rules; the Stoic philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome spoke of duty as living in harmony with the Cosmic order, ”the law of nature.” 

            Persons embracing this ethical norm—consciously or tacitly—will consider it wrong to compromise a strongly held principle and will likely be unable to bring themselves to consider it.

• A second view, known as Utilitarianism, also goes back to ancient Greece and takes the position that avoidance of pain and the seeking of pleasure—broadly defined to include intellectual and aesthetic, as well as physical, pleasures—are basic to all living things, including humans. Therefore, the rightness or wrongness of an act or rule must be determined by the effects it has on the well-being of other people.

            Persons holding this ethical norm—knowingly or implicitly—may be open to considering compromise of a closely held principle when it is demonstrably clear that more people will be better served in this instance than by holding the principle inviolable or, conversely, more may be better served by maintaining the principle .

• The final ethical theory comes down in some ways between the other two. While duty-based ethics emphasizes the ACT itself, and Utilitarianism accentuates the CONSEQUENCES of the act, Virtue-based ethical theory highlights the AGENT, the person making the ethical choice. In this case, one cannot decide ahead of time what is right and wrong, because each person and each situation is unique. This view, too, goes—not surprisingly—back to Plato and Aristotle, but I will not burden you with their versions and draw you instead to a contemporary example of virtue-based ethics called contextualism or situationism. One of its best-known versions is found in Joseph Fletcher’s book, Situation Ethics. He argues that every situation of moral choice has three elements:
  • Sophia, or wisdom, by which he means the rules and principles of one’s culture that are usually adequate for making ethical decisions.
  • Agape, one of the Greek words for “love” with special significance in Christian writings that means acting out of unselfish concern for the well-being of others.
  • Kairos, one of the Greek words for “time,” meaning the uniqueness of the moment, the situation, in which a decision must be made.

            Persons adopting this ethical stance—in theory and/or in practice—are always open to considering compromise, even if the violation of a societal norm or a personally held principal seems called for, in this situation, on the basis of caring concern for a person or persons.

I won’t insult your intelligence by trying to walk us through it, but you can return on your own, if you so choose, to the Homeowners Association dilemma I posed near the beginning of this topic and apply each of these ethical theories or standards to how you would need to proceed to compromise—or not—under each of them. And, in the process, perhaps you will discover—if you don’t already know—with which of these standards you are most comfortable and whether, indeed, one of them might (or might not) be your own ethical stance. And, as I also indicated, while I have tried to offer the “basics” from which any others are drawn, I have not claimed to “cover the waterfront” on this issue.

Conclusion  

I won’t make the over-simplified claim that most people have necessarily “dug down” below their actions to this level of considering the basis for how and when they compromise, or when they make other decisions with moral weight, for that matter. Nor am I criticizing those who haven’t or setting those who have—including myself—on some sort of “superiority” or “know-it-all” pedestal. And, furthermore, I am not asserting that persons in either category—thought-it-through/haven’t-thought-it-through—always act consistently when faced with a set of circumstances that might call for consideration of compromise.

Then what in the bejabbers am I doing?  Simply put, I have been trying to provide the basis and the opportunity for anyone reading this to think through and clarify their own reasons—and possibly those of others—for how and when they compromise or choose not to compromise. Those who had already done so are probably skimming and speed-reading by now or have already stopped reading altogether. So it is, so it has been, so it shall be.

            But if you have managed to stick with these “will-they-never-end” posts, I thank you for your persistence, invite your comments, and hope you have found something helpful, interesting, or stimulating along the way. I leave you with this observation from my final “Reflections on Community” post:

Daniel Weinstock observed, from a “consequentialist” point of view, that we know the “end” we seek—and sometimes, for the sake of community, it justifies the “means” it takes to get there.

Sources Consulted

“Valuing Compromise for the Common Good,” Amy Gutmann and Dennis F. Thompson. Daedalus, Spring 2013.

“Integrity: the virtue of compromise,”Jeremy Schwartz, Palgrave Communications, Article number: 16085, November 29, 2016.

”Ethics of Compromise,” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016, A. Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_2380-1.

“The Mindsets of Political Compromise.” Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, American Political Science Association, 2010.

“Build on Common Ground,” Editorial Board, op.ed. NY Times, Dec. 12, 2020.

“How to Know When to Compromise: 4 Key Questions to Ask,” Tess Pajaron Goalcast, July 28, 2017.

“Common Ground and Common Good,” H.B. Gelatt, Positive Uncertainty, August 16, 2015.

“Does Common Ground Require Agreeing on the Common Good?” Common Ground Committee, February 28, 2018.

“On the possibility of principled moral compromise,” Daniel Weinstock, Published online, Sept. 2, 2013.