In the previous post I tried to establish the lack of clarity or agreement on the characterization of contemporary science. Now, as part of the background against which I will try to sketch some reasonable and inclusive account of the elements at work in the efforts of science to understand the natural world and our place In it—and maybe provide something to “chew on”—let me offer the words of three scholars who have “stepped out on a limb” in offering a definition or characterization of science.

Three Definitions

            The first is from James B. Conant, a celebrated chemist and President of Harvard University:

“I venture to define science as a series of interconnected concepts and  conceptual schemes arising from experiment and observation and further experiment and observation. The test of a scientific theory, I suggest, is its fruitfulness . . . its ability to suggest, stimulate, and direct experiment” (Science and Common Sense, 1951).

The second offering from, again, Percy Bridgman:

“The Scientific method, as far as it is a method, is nothing more than doing one’s damnedest with one’s mind, no holds barred” ( Reflections of a Physicist,1950).

And finally, this from Huston Smith, who is best known as a leading scholar of Religious Studies, but also had an interest in science, as illustrated by his comments on “science and scientism” in his book, Why Religion Matters (2000).  Smith suggests that the sciences have four characteristics:

• • Objectivity (consensual agreement on the basis of evidence),
  • Prediction (securing of anticipated results—it’s not science if it can’t be falsified),
  • Control (ability to manipulate),
  • and Number (mathematics is the language of science).

            With every intention of drawing, as appropriate, from these observations—but also running the risk of being like the preacher who, it was said, “took his text, departed from it, and never returned to it”—feel free to hold me accountable if I don’t! That said, beyond or building upon those characterizations, let me suggest—from a humanist perspective that I hope is neither too simplistic nor in violation of legitimate scientific endeavors— two elements and two levels of the scientific enterprise.

Two Elements

            It seems safe to characterize, in a general way, scientific method as comprised of at least two elements: the empirical—observation—and  the theoretical—the gathering of the facts and some way of making sense of them. Science could hardly advance by either one alone. Observable facts are surely important, but no scientist just goes out “looking for facts.” They are looking for “something.” And the facts they seek are informed and filtered by the objective they have in mind. Jacob Bronowski, a mid-20^th century British mathematician and historian, clearly pointed out the role of the guess, the hunch, the leap of creative imagination, as the initial step in momentous scientific discoveries.  As we know, no scientific theory is a mere collection of facts. It’s the seeing of order, unity, of hidden likeness in the flux of nature by means of some organizing principle, some picture, some metaphor, some symbol—by means of a model. To assume any model is final or to confuse the model with the reality is to be hoodwinked. 

Bronowski said it better:

“Reality is not an exhibit for [our] inspection, labeled ‘do not touch.’ There are no appearances to be photographed, no experiences to be copied, in which we do not take part. Science, like art, is not a copy of nature but a recreation of her” (Science and Human Values, 1956).

Two Levels

            There are some who would like sharply to distinguish science from technology, whereas others refuse to do so. Suffice it to say that the distinction is essentially between

• • “pure” or “theoretical” science, whose goal is knowledge and whose method includes, as noted above, observation and confirmed hypothesis;
  • and “applied” science, or technology, arising from theoretical science, and whose goal is to transform scientific knowledge into technique, to apply it to practical tasks—the joining of our ability to know to our ability to do.

In assessing the impact of science, there is no escaping its technological products. It could be argued that we still live in what, fifty years ago, Theodore Roszak , in his seminal book, The Making of a Counter Culture (1969), called a “technocracy,” which he defined as a society where those who govern justify themselves by appeal to technical experts, who in turn justify themselves by appeal to scientific forms of knowledge, and beyond the authority of science, there is no appeal.

            In any case, once begun, the wedding between science, technology, and industry was complete and the offspring were increasingly numerous. Rarely is a new technological project begun without a study of the relevant scientific data; at the same time, the results of any scientific inquiry are eagerly pounced upon and analyzed by multitudes of technologists for possible applications. Thus each wave of theoretical advance from pure research anticipates a spurt in growth of technology:

• • electronics begat television and computers and global positioning systems (GPS);
  • genetics and biochemistry begat selective breeding and contraceptive pills and tranquilizing drugs;
  • and so on, in any field one chooses to observe

—once the potential for a particular technological development is clear, the actual technology follows, sometimes sooner, sometimes later, but virtually without fail. The results are a mixed blessing but they change the way we live and work and play and communicate and travel—and the list could go on and on.

            But, you’ll be happy to know, I’m not going to go “on and on” on this subject! In the next few posts, as far as my limited knowledge and understanding will allow, we’ll explore:

• • what kind of picture of the natural world does science give us?—“picture,” of course, being the wrong word, but more to follow on that;
  • and based on whatever foundation these reflections have provided, what can we say about our relationship to nature?